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Chapter 2  pp. 37-68 
 
 
 
CRITICAL THINKING AND SYSTEMS THINKING: 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL LITERACY FOR SYSTEMS 
THINKING IN PRACTICE 
 
 
Martin Reynolds* 
Communication and Systems Department, The Open University, Walton Hall 
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA UK 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“The core aspects of systems thinking are gaining a bigger picture (going up a level of 
abstraction) and appreciating other people’s perspectives” (Chapman 2004 p. 14)  
 
This simple distinction made by Jake Chapman builds upon a distinction made by 
Richard Bawden  in identifying two transitions implicit in systems thinking; one, towards 
holism, and another towards pluralism  (Bawden 1998). The transitions speak of two worlds. 
One, the holistic ontological real-world ‘universe’ of interdependent elements, encapsulating 
complex interrelationships. Two, an epistemological socially constructed world of 
‘multiverse’ (cf. Maturana and Poerksen 2004 p.38), encapsulating differing perspectives on 
reality. The two worlds are of course abstractions – ways of framing. This act of framing 
itself constitutes a third distinct critical world. This is a world  where boundaries inevitably 
need to be made and questioned on  the inevitable limitations on (i)  framing reality (limits on 
being holistically ‘universe’), and (ii) framing engagement with reality (limits on being 
pluralistically ‘multiverse’). Whilst striving towards aspirations of holism and pluralism, this 
third critical dimension confers a peculiar sense of grounding, purposefulness and 
responsibility in systems thinking. 
As Werner Ulrich shows in his seminal work Critical Heuristics of Social Planning 
(1983), the systems ‘idea’ as a philosophical tool can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s 
1784 enlightenment treatise - Critique of Pure Reason. Kant uses the systems idea as an 
holistic concept: 
“ - a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and which contains 
the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and relation to the other parts. 
This idea accordingly postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the 
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understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system 
connected according to necessary laws” (Immanuel Kant, 1784, quoted in Ulrich, 1983 p.223; 
Ulrich’s italics) 
 
The systems idea as originally formulated by Kant is an abstract holistic principle used as 
a means for understanding ‘the real world’. The Kantian critical interpretation of the systems 
idea rests on the principle that it is simply not possible to have comprehensive knowledge. In 
the subsequent treatise Kant “undertakes the dialectical task of making reason reflect upon its 
own limitations” (Ulrich, 1983:269). Critique of Pure Reason formulates an original critical 
interpretation to the systems idea. In course, the critique provides a fundamental and enduring 
epistemological challenge to classical comprehensive rationalism; a rationalism that assumes 
the possibility of comprehensive knowledge and understanding. 
Werner Ulrich’s critical systems heuristics is often regarded as an example of one 
particular tradition of systems thinking called critical systems thinking (CST). 
The positivist interpretation of systems science came under critical review during the 
1970s most notably through the works of C. West Churchman (1970) and Russell Ackoff  
(1974) in America and Peter Checkland (1979) in England (original papers reproduced in 
Flood and Jackson, 1991a). Checkland built on Churchman’s critique, defining an alternative 
“soft” systems tradition, and naming the former as the “hard” systems tradition. Around the 
same time Werner Ulrich was also building on Churchman’s work, subsequently contributing 
to what later came to be referred to as a “critical” systems tradition (cf. Flood & Jackson, 
1991a). Contemporary systems approaches can then be classified as ‘hard’, ‘soft’, or 
‘critical’, according to the degree to which they maintain Kant’s original critical sense of the 
systems idea (see Figure 1). 
 
Systems ‘Type’ 
& philosophical origins* 
Selected Systems Approaches 
 
 
Hard Systems  
Ontology: 
Epistemology: 
Intention: 
realism 
positivism 
control 
• general systems theory (Bertalanfy, 1940)  
• classical ‘mechanistic’ cybernetics (Ashby, 1956)  
• operations research (Churchman, Ackoff & Arnoff, 
1957) 
• systems engineering (Hall, 1962) 
• socio-technical systems (Trist et al., 1963) 
• RAND-systems analysis (Optner, 1965)  
• system dynamics (Forrester, 1961; 1971; Meadows et 
al., 1972; 1992; Senge, 1990) 
• organic cybernetics (Beer, 1979; Varela et al., 1974) 
Soft Systems  
Ontology: 
Epistemology: 
 
Intention: 
nominalism 
constructivist 
interpretivism  
appreciation 
• Inquiring systems design (Churchman, 1971) 
• soft systems methodology (Checkland, 1981)  
• strategic assumption surface testing (Mason & Mitroff, 
1981) 
• interactive management (Ackoff, 1981) 
• cognitive mapping and strategic options development 
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analysis (Eden and Ackermann, 1988) 
 
Critical Systems  
Ontology: 
Epistemology 
 
 
Intention: 
nominalism 
constructivist/ 
critical 
idealism 
emancipation 
• critical systems heuristics (Ulrich, 1983) 
• system of systems methodologies (Jackson & Keys, 
1984) 
• community operational research  (Rosenhead, 1984)  
• liberating systems theory (Flood, 1990) 
• interpretive systemology (Fuenmayor, 1991) 
• total systems intervention (Jackson & Flood, 1991) 
• systemic intervention (Midgley, 2000) 
 
* Glossary of Terminology 
Ontology (assumptions about the nature of ‘things’ or ‘being’). 
realism:  ‘real world’ is made up of systems. 
nominalism: systems are means of re-presenting (naming) phenomena of the real world. 
 
Epistemology (assumptions of knowledge generation). 
positivism: validity based on ‘objective’ scientific method of gathering empirical facts.  
constructivism: knowledge is socially constructed  
interpretivism: validity based upon ‘subjective’ interpretations (multiple realities) of 
phenomena.  
critical 
idealism: 
phenomena (maps), as distinct from noumena (objects), are imbued with 
human purpose and must lay open their perspective and purpose for critical 
reflection 
 
Intention (primary pledge or human purpose embodied in systems approach). 
control: enables  technical mastery over natural and social entities. 
appreciation: enables furthering communication and understanding  between different 
groups. 
emancipation: enables freedom from coercive material and ideological forces. 
Figure 1. An overview of systems approaches and their philosophical origins . 
(Adapted from Reynolds and Holwell, 2010 p. 10) 
 
Rather than exploring one tradition of systems thinking – CST -  this chapter explores the 
notion of contemporary systems thinking as being implicitly critical. An argument will be 
made that the need for what might be called a ‘systems literacy’ reflects a need for the 
original critical idea of systems. The basis of such a literacy is a proposed framework of 
systems thinking in practice based on revised ideas of boundary critique (Ulrich and 
Reynolds, 2010). After describing what this critical literacy in systems thinking in practice 
looks like and entails, the question of how the critical kernel emerged amongst contemporary 
systems thinking in practice approaches is examined. This section traces the influence of 
critical thinking traditions on systems thinking. Finally, some views are offered on why 
attention to the critical literacy of systems thinking in practice is significant to a contemporary 
world beset with complex issues of change and uncertainty.  
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2. WHAT IS CRITICAL IN SYSTEMS THINKING IN PRACTICE? 
 
“Systems literacy is not just about measurement. The learning journey up the ladder of 
complexity—from quarks, to atoms, to molecules, to organisms, to ecosystems—will be made 
using judgment as much as instruments. Simulations about key scientific ideas and 
visualizations of complex knowledge can attract attention—but the best learning takes place 
when groups of people interact physically and perceptually with scientific knowledge, and 
with each other, in a critical spirit. The point of systems literacy is to enable collaborative 
action, to develop a shared vision of where we want to be.” (Thackara, 2005)  
 
“Clear systems thinking is one of the basic literacies of the modern world” commented 
Geoff Mulgan – a senior government advisor in the UK government’s Cabinet Office during 
the 1990s… “not least because it offers unexpected insights that are not amenable to common 
sense” (Mulgan, 1997). Our common sense understanding of situations is continually and 
inadvertently shaped by our actions or practice. In the same way effective systems thinking is 
a literacy that is continually being informed, moulded and (re)shaped by ongoing practice. It 
is this interplay between conceptual tools and practice that resonates with the idea of  systems 
thinking in practice as an important development in critical thinking.  
The name - systems thinking in practice - suggests an important interplay between 
understanding and practice; systems thinking continually being informed, moulded and 
(re)shaped by ongoing practice. Systems thinking in practice deals with what might be 
considered to be the critical literacy required to be competent practitioners in supporting real 
world decision-making. The name provides a continual reminder of the important interplay 
between understanding and practice. 
 
Systems thinking in practice involves stepping back from messy situations of complexity, 
change, and uncertainty, and clarifying key interrelationships and perspectives on the 
situation. It further requires engaging with multiple often contrasting perspectives amongst 
stakeholders involved with and affected by the situation so as to best direct responsible 
joined-up thinking with action to bring about morally justifiable improvements. 
 
The above definition encapsulates three generalized purposeful orientations of systems 
thinking in practice (Reynolds & Howell, 2010 p.17): 
 
1) Making sense of, or simplifying (in understanding), relationships between different 
entities associated with a complex situation. The prime intention is not to get some 
thorough comprehensive knowledge of situations, but rather to acquire a better 
appreciation of wider dynamics in order to improve the situation. 
2) Surfacing and engaging (through practice) contrasting perspectives associated with 
complex situations. The prime intention here is not to embrace all perspectives on a 
predetermined problem so as to solve the problem, but rather to allow for 
possibilities in reshaping a problem-situation for improved possibilities of resolution. 
3) Exploring and reconciling (with responsibility) ethical issues and power relations, 
both expressions of boundary issues associated with inevitable partial understandings 
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of a situation and partiality amongst different stakeholders. The intention here is to 
gently disrupt, unsettle and thereby provoke new systems thinking. 
 
An effective systems approach to managing real world complex situations embodies all 
three aspects of systems thinking in practice.  
The criticality of systems thinking in practice can be expressed in terms of promoting 
continual and meaningful conversation. The ‘conversation’ works at two levels. One is an 
expression of boundary reflection, a conversation between our conceptual constructs of real 
world realities – constructs called ‘systems’ - and the actual realities being addressed. The 
other is an expression of boundary discourse, a conversation between people involved with 
and affected by the systems used to construct and engage with reality (Ulrich and Reynolds, 
2010). Whereas boundary reflection is a conversation influenced by conventional critical 
systems thinking, boundary discourse is influenced also by traditions of social learning. Both 
conversations constitute what might be referred to as boundary critique, a triadic interplay 
between judgements of ‘fact’, value judgements, and boundary judgements, underpinning 
systems thinking in practice. Ulrich describes this interplay as an  ‘eternal triangle’: 
 
“Thinking through the triangle means to consider each of its corners in the light of the 
other two. For example, what new facts become relevant if we expand the boundaries of the 
reference system or modify our value judgments? How do our valuations look if we consider 
new facts that refer to a modified reference system? In what way may our reference system 
fail to do justice to the perspective of different stakeholder groups? Any claim that does not 
reflect on the underpinning ‘triangle’ of boundary judgments, judgments of facts, and value 
judgments, risks claiming too much, by not disclosing its built-in selectivity” (Ulrich 2003 
p.334)  
 
Boundary critique can be described in terms of activities underpinning a framework of 
systems thinking in practice; constituting what has been referred to as an overall critical 
systems framework (Reynolds 2008a). The framework is supported by three (sub)frameworks 
respectively – framework for understanding (fwU), framework for practice (fwP), and a 
framework for responsibility (fwR) - The activities of boundary critique involve continual 
revising of boundary judgements (systems thinking) with judgements of ‘fact’ (observing) 
and value judgements (evaluating) (see Figure 2).  
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Adapted from Reynolds 2008a  p.386. 
Figure 2. Critical systems framework illustrating systems thinking in practice activities. 
In developing this into a broader heuristic for systems thinking in practice, three 
complementary entities can be added: firstly, real-world contexts of change and uncertainty 
associated with a framework for understanding; secondly, people or practitioners involved 
with making change associated with a framework for practice; and thirdly, the ideas and 
concepts – including systems - as tools for effecting change associated with a framework for 
responsibility.  
What is critical in systems thinking in practice is: (i) an appreciation that complex 
realities, despite good intentions with complexity sciences, can never be holistically 
comprehended; (ii) an acknowledgement that any perspective on a situation is laden with 
values that inhibit any sense of neutral engagement; and (iii) an awareness of the limitations 
of systems design in the light of (i) and (ii).  
 
 
3. HOW SYSTEMS THINKING BECAME CRITICAL 
 
Systems science emerged in the 1940s and 1950s in response to clear problems of 
military logistics generated during World War Two. Whilst the problems addressed by 
variants of systems science (systems engineering, system dynamics, systems analysis and 
operations research) might be highly complicated in terms of involving many variables, the 
problem situation could nevertheless be well defined; that is, the methods would serve what 
Jackson and Keys (1983) would call a clearly defined “unitary purpose”. A war-time 
consensus is likely to generate broad and common objectives. 
Critical Thinking and Systems Thinking (pp.37-68) 
Systems science relates to the transformation in practice in order to address issues of 
interrelatedness and pluralism in perspectivs. In the late 1950s, operations research (OR - 
outside of America the term used is ‘operational’ research), previously used as a means of 
controlling non-human (hardware) variables in weapon, computer, or space systems, was 
applied to the more challenging task of addressing organisational, community and societal 
problems. The increasingly pluralistic demands of the post-war/post-colonial era, provided 
new challenges for systems science techniques. In systems science, the response was soft 
systems thinking and critical systems thinking  (see Figure 1). 
The emergence of ‘soft’ and ‘critical’ systems approaches since the 1980s can best be 
understood as an epistemological challenge to the systems idea as described by Ulrich: 
 
“The systems idea as we understand it does not presuppose that we can know ‘the whole 
system’, but only that we can undertake a critical effort to reflect on the inevitable lack of 
comprehensiveness in our understanding and design for (social) systems. Thus the systems 
idea, if we do not scientistically misunderstand it, challenges us to make transparent to 
ourselves and to others the normative implications of our systems concepts and designs” 
(Ulrich, 1983 p.21). 
 
During the Second World War the ‘systems idea’ acquired currency as an operational 
tool. Systems engineering and OR transformed the holistic idea into a methodological tool for 
controlling variables within the context of clearly pre-defined instrumental action. At the 
same time ‘systems science’ and Bertalanffy’s ‘general systems theory’ translated the 
epistemologically critical interpretation of Kant’s systems idea into an ontological realist 
concept of systems as actual comprehensive representations of  ‘real world’ phenomena. This 
now pervades everyday language reference to the ‘education system’, ‘health system’ or 
‘legal system’ etc. Systems as concepts assumed a social ‘factual’ status. The application of 
OR to organisational and societal problems further entrenched systems thinking into a 
positivist epistemological framework associated with the narrow instrumental purposes of 
gathering empirical ‘facts’. 
In seeking to identify more clearly just what the critical systems idea is and its relevance 
to contemporary systems thinking in practice literacy, three dimensions of analysis are used in 
critiquing each of the hard and soft systems traditions. Each of the three dimensions - 
contexts, practitioners, and systems as conceptual constructs - correspond to the systems 
thinking in practice framework introduced earlier (Figure 2). 
 
 
3.1. Critique of the ‘Hard’ Systems Tradition 
 
Context Matters 
From the 1950s, Churchman and Ackoff were amongst the pioneers applying principles 
of operations research to organisational management and wider societal issues (Churchman 
et.al., 1957). Ackoff (1981) following the lead of Churchman’s critique of OR, expands on 
how approaches to problem-solving based upon assumptions of  consensual, unitary purpose 
could not be applied as a tool for most social systems design, characterised more often by 
complexity and conflict. Complexity is not of the type that arises from some innate but 
growing complexity factor in institutional dynamics, but is rather derived from taking account 
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of conflicting human perceptions and interests involved in applied systems dynamics (cf. 
Ellis, 1995). The American Apollo Space Programme provides perhaps the best example of 
overcoming considerable technical complexity using ‘hard’ systems (operations) research in 
achieving the goal of putting a man on the moon. In allowing technology to be mobilised for 
such a unitary purpose, instrumental questions of ‘how’ resources might be deployed to 
achieve the objective dominated, first, practical questions concerning ‘what’ resources were 
actually available, and second, ethical questions of ‘why’ resource use needed to be 
prioritised for this mission. The powerful instrumental techniques of OR and other ‘hard’ 
system variants were effectively allowed free rein.  
In contrast, Churchman and Ackoff could document the failures of OR in contexts where 
the purpose and purposefulness were ill-defined because of conflicting interests amongst 
different actors. On one level OR developed academically with the pursuit of ‘modelling’ 
techniques “ - a study of the delights of algorithms; nuances of game theory; fascinating but 
irrelevant things that can happen in queues” (Churchman in 1979 p. 50). In instances where 
the instrumental force of techniques assumes an authority of its own, effectively by-passing 
issues of purpose, the ‘irrelevance’ of approaches might be transformed into a more intrusive 
form - what has been termed a “cybernetic technocratism” (Flood, 1990), or where, in terms 
of social planning, there is a propensity for the means to define the ends (Ulrich 1988a). 
 
Practitioner Matters 
Hard systems thinking in social science is characterised by a positivist epistemology 
wherein the systems being examined assume the status of real world objects - a realist 
ontology - in much the same way that natural ‘objective’ science based on empiricism treats 
its subject-matter (Churchman, 1970, in Flood and Jackson 1991a). Checkland (1981), 
Jackson (1985),  Flood and Jackson (1991b) and Ellis (1995) draw  attention to Burrell and 
Morgan’s 1974 typology of four social science paradigms - subjectivist “radical humanism” 
and “interpretivism”, and objectivist “radical structuralism” and “functionalism” - in 
signalling the correspondence between the “functionalist paradigm” and hard systems 
thinking. The paradigm claims that sociological ‘models’, represent actual ‘systems’ 
constituents of the real world which, once conceptually formulated can then be legitimately 
engineered. There appears to be general agreement that the enduring legacy of perceiving 
‘systems’ in terms of a realist ontology - existing outside of human purposefulness - was 
strongly influenced by Bertalanffy’s ‘general systems theory’ in the 1940s (Checkland, 1991; 
Jackson, 1990; Flood & Ulrich, 1991). Such theoretical underpinning promotes systems 
practice as an essentially regulatory function.  
 
Systems Change Matters 
The technical bias and positivist theoretical underpinnings of hard systems thinking lends 
itself to a perspective of systems as homeostatic, ‘closed’, and with an equilibrium to be 
maintained. The task of systems practice from the ‘hard’ perspective, as Oliga (1990)  
observes, is to ensure the ‘stability’ of such systems. Control is the management intention 
which systems practice is seen to serve. In narrowly focusing on goals and instrumental 
‘means’ for achieving the goals, rather than allowing for questioning the systems’ built in 
objectives (purpose) and underlying interests (purposefulness),  social consequences of 
systems design are ignored (Checkland, 1981). The result of this orientation towards control 
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is to maintain or even accentuate existing power relations implicit in the system (Flood & 
Ulrich 1991). 
Checkland (1978) points out how the ‘hard’ systems tradition promotes the ‘neutral’ 
‘value-free’ image of the systems analyst. Implicitly, therefore, it would appear that 
institutional conservatism relates as much to stabilising the institutional practice of systems 
analysis (authority of the experts) as with stabilising institutional practice of client 
organisations being served by systems analysis. 
 
Towards Soft Systems Approaches 
From the late 1970s the three dimensions of critique were translated into two distinct 
systems’ approaches; firstly, a soft systems approach that focused primarily on developing an 
epistemological challenge in the practitioner domain, and secondly, a critical systems 
approach which focused increasingly more on the political challenge generated in the systems 
change dimension. The soft systems ‘interpretivist’ approach attempts to; (a) provide the 
basis for techniques to address pluralist  purposes, (b) adopt the principle of  ‘multiple 
realities’ as an anti-positivist (interpretivist) theoretical framework, and (c) promote 
institutional change (Jackson, 1991a; Flood and Ulrich, 1990). Amongst the soft systems 
approaches to emerge in the 1980s (see Figure 1), Checkland’s (1981) soft systems 
methodology (SSM), developed with colleagues at Lancaster University, is one of the best 
known and most enduring (case studies are particularly well documented in Checkland and 
Scholes, 1990). 
The success of SSM might be attributed to the detailed development of methodological 
procedures for addressing complex human-based problem situations. These are commonly 
represented as an iterative learning cycle with seven stages of enquiry (Figure 3) although 
Checkland himself more recently describes it in terms of two parallel streams of enquiry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Martin Reynolds  
 
Stage 1 The `problem situation' unstructured 
 The remit of intervention is identified, providing the site sometimes referred to as ‘the mess’ 
Stage 2  The problem-situation expressed 
 Ordinarily carried out through a rich picture; a tool used for brainstorming ideas of the problem 
situation usually with the active collaboration of those involved with the system. Designed to 
generate the main issues (e.g. conflicts) and tasks (e.g. communication links, social or institutional 
norms and roles) of the system. 
Stage 3  Root definitions of relevant systems 
 Systems deemed relevant to the problem situation are first conceptually identified through isolation 
of ‘problem themes’, named and provided with concise root definitions; formulated around 
fundamental systems questions encapsulated in the mnemonic CATWOE: 
 
Customers/clients : beneficiaries of ‘T’ 
Actors/agents: those who would do ‘T’; ‘experts' 
Transformation (‘T’): the purpose of the system 
Weltanschauung (worldview): value-informed view which makes ‘T’ meaningful 
Owner(s): decision makers who control conditions of the system  
Environment: ‘constraining’ elements outside the system  
 
Stage 4  Conceptual modelling 
 To encapsulate the key activities which the system must undertake in order to fulfil the 
requirements of the root definition. System models are expressions of ideal forms of organised 
activities. Derived from the root definition rather than rich picture. Used for pro-active 
interrogative and analytical work, rather than a contrivance at representing ‘reality’. 
Stage 5: Comparative analysis 
 Conceptual constructs (models) compared with the ‘realities of the mess’. Carried out both  
monologically, comparing conceptual models with the ‘rich picture’ formulated in Stage 2, and/or, 
more preferably, dialogically, in a process of re-presenting models back to those involved with the 
system in order gain critical feedback. 
Stage 6: Debate changes 
 The critique emerging from Stage 5 is used as the basis for a debate amongst those involved with 
the system, concerning the desirability and feasibility of future changes 
Stage 7: Action to improve the situation 
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 Implementing changes agreed upon during the Stage 6 debate or reverting back to Stage 3. 
Source: adapted from Checkland, 1981. 
Figure 3. Stages of Soft Systems Methodology. 
A distinction between a ‘logic-based stream of analysis’ (represented by the 7 stage core 
method) and a ‘stream of cultural analysis’, articulated later by Checkland and Scholes 
(1990), precludes any assumption of a linear flow between these seven stages. The ‘cultural 
analysis’ constituent of the framework, reinforces the essential iterative nature of SSM. It is a 
particularly important constituent to stages 1 and 2 of the core method, providing a dialogical 
means towards defining relevant systems in stage 3. 
 
 
3.2. Critique of ‘Soft’ Systems 
 
Context Matters 
Jackson (1982) questioned the ambitions of soft systems thinking as expressed in the 
work of Churchman, Ackoff, and Checkland, arguing that the domain of application for soft 
systems remains, as with hard systems, restricted. Jackson observed that soft systems can 
only work in conditions which allows for “genuine” debate amongst those involved. Despite 
many years of documented practical success there would appear also to be circumstances that 
mitigate against its successful deployment: 
 
“SSM continues to be employed uncritically in problem situations where the mobilisation 
of differentiated power resources by different interest groups makes genuine participation 
impossible” (Jackson, 1990 p. 362). 
 
Flood and Jackson (1991b) further argue that SSM practitioners often compound this 
problem by advocating for SSM a status as a ‘meta-methodology’ incorporating hard systems 
as a constituent part of SSM. 
 
Practitioner Matters 
Jackson’s critique of soft systems approaches are rooted in the assertion that interpretivist 
theory offers nothing in relation to theorising about institutional change... “It is surprising to 
find that at the moment no genuinely interpretive systems theory exists... Such a theory would 
have to probe the systemic nature of interpretations individuals employ in constructing the 
social world” (Jackson, 1982 p.18). John Oliga (1988), whilst acknowledging the 
achievement of soft systems approaches in having made an ontological break with 
empiricism, rejecting realist assumptions of there being an ‘objective’ world of social facts,  
suggests that soft systems practitioners continue to assume attaining ‘objective knowledge’ at 
the level of theory. In pursuing this point, Oliga distinguishes between ‘naturalistic’ and 
‘historic’ hermeneutics; suggesting that it is the former which effectively objectifies others’ 
realities. The validity of SSM is based upon respect for the point of view and aims of all the 
‘stakeholders’. However, Oliga argues that because SSM practitioners neglect the influence 
of social structural factors on the formation, maintenance and (it might be added) articulation 
of worldviews – a term introduced by Churchman (1971) in translation of the more rich 
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German term, Weltanschauung - they perpetuate ontological realism at the theoretical level 
despite having made an ontological break with empiricism at the methodological level. 
The effect, referred to as “epistemological impoverishment” (Flood & Ulrich, 1991 p. 
306), is to produce a theoretical stance which is relativistic and without external 
legitimisation. Similarly, Jackson (1991a) argues, change can only be understood in SSM via 
the processes of communication facilitating mutual understanding between the involved 
actors. This is epistemologically ‘impoverished’ through not being able to appreciate the 
‘effects of material conditions’ and the incidence of ‘false consciousness’ on peoples’ 
worldviews (Flood & Ulrich, 1991). 
 
Systems Change Matters 
 
“What I hear Habermas arguing is that the debate at stages 5 and 6 of the soft systems 
methodology will be inhibited by society’s structure. I think that it is in the nature of society 
that this will be so.” (Checkland, 1981 p. 283). 
 
“Recommendations of soft systems thinking remain “regulative”  because no attempt is 
made to ensure that the conditions for “genuine” debate are provided” (Jackson, 1991b p.133). 
 
SSM does not discriminate between worldviews. According to Jackson, the methodology 
is therefore ‘ideologically naive’ since no attempt is made to relate worldviews to social 
relations of power effecting incidences of false consciousness. 
 
Put another way;  “...there are no explicit directives in the theory that aim to prevent the 
approach from being expert driven” (Flood & Ulrich 1991p. 198). An authority is implicitly 
established by virtue of there being no explicit reference to theory (cf. Sangren, 1988). 
 
Oliga (1990) maps out an architecture of power and ideology in relation to different 
systems practice, and examines how underlying assumptions inform institutional perspectives 
of ‘stability’ (social control) and ‘change’ (social transformation). Whilst hard systems 
thinking (as a function of positivism) typically neglects the subjective domain of  
‘worldviews’ and focuses on relations of power as constituents of systems regulation, soft 
systems typically neglect the relations of power determining ideology. Oliga argues that by 
focusing upon either one or the other in the ‘power/ideology’ dialectic, both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
traditions implicitly share a conservative view of using systems practice for social control; 
that is, maintaining social order in the face of actual or potential conflicts. What may appear 
to be institutional liberalisation, as professed by some soft systems practitioners, turns out to 
be ideological conservatism (a point made by Flood & Ulrich, 1991); ideology removed from 
relations of power. 
 
Towards Critical Systems Approaches  
To summarise the critique so far, contextual concerns have questioned the 
(in)appropriateness of systems approaches in application to diverse and often conflicting 
human purposes. Practitioner concerns have generated debate over the principles behind the 
social construction of knowledge in relation to the ‘systems idea’. Since the 1940s with 
Bertalanfy’s realist ontological interpretation of ‘systems’, considerable confusion between 
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the ontological and epistemological conceptualisations of systems have beleaguered the 
systems literature (Flood & Ulrich, 1990:186; Checkland, 1991p. 26). Finally, systems and 
institutional concerns over social/political stability and change have raised fundamental issues 
concerning power and ideology in relation to systems practice. 
At the same time that Peter Checkland was establishing soft systems methodology, 
Werner Ulrich (1983) was formulating critical systems heuristics (CSH). Both addressed 
problems of applying ‘hard’ systems practice - particularly as manifest in operations research 
- to social affairs. Both acknowledge significant influence from Churchman (1971) who first 
introduced the idea, derived from his mentor Edgar A. Singer, that social systems are 
teleological or, in more common language, purposeful. 
Whereas in soft system practice the original systems idea (as a human construct) was 
thought best to be reinvented through new terminology - “wholismic thinking” (Ackoff, 
1981) or “holonic thinking” (Checkland, 1991) - abandoning the term ‘systems thinking’ to 
its realist ontological colonisation (ibid p. 27), Churchman and Ulrich significantly retain the 
idea of a system bounded by “whole system judgements”; constructs imbued with human 
intentionality. The use of the term “systemic” thinking and practice encapsulates and retains 
the meaning of the original epistemological intention of the systems idea. 
In the following sub-section concepts and ideas derived from Churchman and Ulrich are 
traced, providing a further understanding of the idea of a critical dimension to systems 
thinking in practice.  
 
 
3.3. Emergence of Boundary Critique  
 
Context Matters 
Churchman’s characterisation of purposeful systems dealt initially with only those 
involved in the systems design. Nine conditions that must be fulfilled for a system (S) to 
demonstrate purposefulness were identified (derived from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant). 
The conditions are reproduced in summary below (adapted from Churchman, 1971 p. 43) 
 
1) S is teleological 
2) S has a measure of performance 
3) There is a client whose interests are served by S 
4) S has teleological components which coproduce the measure of performance of S 
5) S has an environment (both social and ecological) 
6) S has a decision maker who can produce changes in the measure of performance of 
S’s components and hence changes in the measure of performance of S 
7) S has a designer who influences the decision maker 
8) The designer aims to maximise S’s value to the client 
9) There is a built in guarantee that the purpose of S defined by the designer’s notion of 
the measure of performance can be achieved and secured 
 
Churchman (1979 p. 79) later reordered these nine conditions into three groups of three 
categories; each group corresponding with a particular social role - client, decision maker, 
and planner. Each category is associated with two allied categories which Ulrich later termed 
role specific concerns and key problems. Reynolds later renamed these three category groups 
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in terms of stakeholders, stakes and stakeholding issues (Reynolds, 2007). Ulrich also 
identified each category group with a term reflecting the primary source of influence - 
motivation, control, and expertise - for client, decision maker, and planner (“designer”) 
respectively (Ulrich, 1983 p. 250) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Categories of ‘Involved’ in a Purposeful System’s Design  
 
Churchman’s 1971 
nine conditions for a 
purposeful system 
Churchman’s 1979 three groups of 
three categories for a purposeful 
system 
Ulrich’s 1983 sources of 
influence informing a 
purposeful system  
 
Group 1 
condition 3.  social role: client sources of motivation: whose 
condition 1. role specific concerns: purpose purposes are served? 
condition 2. key problems: measure of performance  
 
Group 2 
condition 6. social role: decision maker sources of control: who has 
condition 4. role specific concerns: components the power to decide? 
condition 5. key problems: environment  
 
Group 3 
condition 7. social role: planner/designer sources of expertise: who 
condition 8. role specific concerns: implementation has the know-how? 
condition 9. key problems: guarantor  
 
 
Churchman (1979 p.80) suggests a role for those affected by systems design, and 
provides a self-reflective description of  an additional three categories that centre around the 
role of systems philosopher; along with the two related categories, the enemies of the systems 
approach and significance. It is Ulrich (1983) however who systematically distinguishes 
between those involved in a system’s design and those affected by a systems design so as to 
define the latter role more concisely for social systems planning. The category of those 
affected by, but not involved in, systems design are designated by Ulrich as being the witness; 
those who in practical discourse will argue the case of the affected  (ibid p. 252). The role 
specific concerns of the witness are conceptualised as those of emancipation; liberation from 
oppressive material conditions and false consciousness. 
 
“... it [emancipation] reminds us that social mapping and design is not merely a matter of 
instrumental orientation toward some purpose (as functionalistic “systems science” seems to 
assume), but that for socially rational planning it is essential that the planner initiate a process 
of emancipatory self-reflection on the part of the affected” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 257; original 
italics). 
 
The final ‘key problem’ category represents the possibilities of a conflict in worldviews - 
“different visions of what social reality and human life in it ought to be” (ibid) - between the 
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involved and the affected. Consequently the “source of influence” for this category group is 
defined as the source of legitimisation. Table 2 summarises the twelve “critical-heuristic 
categories.” 
 
Table 2. Critical-Heuristic Categories 
 
Categories Dimensions of intentionality 
1 
2  
3 
Client?. Purpose? 
Measure of      
improvement? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
 
Sources of 
motivation 
  
 
The purposeful 
4 
5  
6 
Decision maker? 
Components? 
Environment? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
 
Sources of  
control 
 
Those involved 
System of 
concern 
(or context 
7 
8  
9 
Planner? 
Expertise? 
Guarantor? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
sources of 
expertise 
 of application) 
on which depends 
the meaning of 
10 
11 
12 
Witness? 
Emancipation? 
Worldviews? 
(role) 
(concerns) 
(problems) 
sources of 
legitimisation 
Those affected ‘improvement’ 
Adapted from Ulrich, 1983:258; 1993 p.595 and 1996 p.43. 
 
Checkland (1981) similarly uses Churchman’s nine conditions of a purposeful system as 
a basis for formulating the CATWOE mnemonic (client, actor, transformation, worldview, 
owner, and environment; see Figure 2). It has been argued that Checkland uses the conditions 
in a functionalist manner by accepting them as given, though defined differently by different 
stakeholders. Consequently, Ulrich (1983 p. 247, footnote 11), for example, argues that SSM 
contributes (albeit unintentionally) to systems maintenance. In contrast, Churchman and 
Ulrich engage in challenging the conditions by asking for each condition what ‘is’ the actual 
situation in juxtaposition to what ‘ought’ to be the ideal situation. This engagement with the 
ethics of conditions - encouraging an ‘is’/’ought’ dialogue - and Ulrich’s subsequent 
development of the categories associated with the ‘affected’ (Churchman’s “systems’ 
enemies”) in juxtaposition with the ‘involved’ - is a key distinction between Checkland’s 
SSM and the critical systems approach. 
Churchman (1979) in The Systems Approach and Its Enemies describes his purposeful 
systems inquiry as a process of unfolding, though refrains from providing any precise 
definition. In examining his own twelve categories of ‘whole systems judgements’ belonging 
to a purposeful system, Churchman states:  
 
“I’ll be more interested in their process of unfolding rather than in their 
definitions...(and).. in explaining the unfolding of meaning, I’ll use imagery, and specifically 
the imagery of striving-force and the opposite, passive-helplessness” (Churchman, 1979 p. 
80). 
 
Unfolding as a dialectical process comes closest to any form of definition offered. Ulrich 
also appreciates Churchman’s process of unfolding as a dialectic: 
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“We call this dialectical interplay between planners  (“systems rationality”) and witnesses 
(lived social practice) the process of unfolding. The process of unfolding is intended to 
represent our critical, and practicable, solution to the problem of practical discourse” (Ulrich, 
1983 p. 266, original italics). 
 
Ulrich is describing here what in later years he would refer to as constituting the last of 
three steps of unfolding: first, the mapping out of the twelve categories (roles, concerns, 
problems) in the form of “boundary questions”; second, contrasting “actual with ideal” 
mapping; and third, promoting “stakeholder participation” (Ulrich, 1988a pp. 423-425).  
The first step is analogous Singer’s holistic concept of sweeping in (Churchman, 1979 
p.78; Ulrich, 1988a p. 423). In CSH terms this exercise is undertaken with precise guidelines 
associated with what is termed the “social mapping” of the twelve boundary questions 
(‘roles’, ‘role-concerns’, and ‘key problems’) associated with sources of motivation; control, 
knowledge, and legitimacy; each source of influence  (Table 2).1 
Whilst sweeping in conjures up an endless quest for comprehensiveness, the process of 
unfolding has been described as “the critical counterpart to the sweep-in process” (ibid). The 
critical idea of the sweep-in concept is to increase the awareness and understanding of 
systems’ dimensions and concerns from various perspectives. This is undertaken through the 
subsequent two steps of unfolding: firstly, through subjecting each of the twelve boundary 
questions to an “is” and an “ought” mode, and secondly, through subjecting the systems 
design (as created by those involved) to a wider democratic process “in which the affected 
citizens emancipate themselves from the premises and promises of experts” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 
263, my italics).  
The second and third ‘steps’ of unfolding as described by Ulrich prompt questions 
regarding the underlying practitioner underpinnings and systems implications of CSH.  
 
Practitioner Matters 
A feature of Ulrich’s CSH is the attempt to marry the ideas from Habermasian critical 
social theory with the concerns of systems practice so as to effect an alternative practical 
approach to enquiry (Ulrich, 1983:106-166). The approach builds upon Churchman’s ideas of 
systems practice as a dialectical pursuit; though Ulrich more precisely associates the 
dialectics of systems practice with Habermas’ pragmatistic model of rational discourse and 
communicative action (ibid pp. 240-243). The model challenges the means/end dichotomy 
prevalent in positivist approaches manifest in what Habermas refers to as decisionistic and 
technocratic models of social enquiry. Decisionistic models separate the privilege of choosing 
between ‘ends’, seen as located in the domain of politics, from the value free ‘means’, located 
in the domain of expertise. Technocratic models reverse the primacy of the politician over the 
expert implicit in the decisionistic model, and suggests instead that the political process in 
decision making is simply a “stopgap in a still imperfect rationalisation of power, in which 
the initiative has in any case passed to scientific analysis and technical planning” (Habermas, 
1971, quoted in Ulrich, 1983 p. 75). Both models assume the separability of means and ends.  
                                                        
1
 Ulrich distinguishes between social mapping and social design: “If the task is to determine... actual social reality, 
i.e., the problem situation, we speak of “mapping”; if the task is to determine (“make real”) future social 
reality, we speak of “design”” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 242). Social design corresponds with the SSM principle of 
conceptual modelling. 
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The pragmatistic model in contrast identifies a dialectic between means or expertise, 
representing questions of fact, and decision making about ends or politics, representing 
questions of value: 
 
“The dialectical or “pragmatistic” model thus requires a model of rational discourse 
between experts and political agencies, a model that can guarantee an adequate translation of 
practical needs into technical questions, and of technical answers into practical decisions. The 
basic requirement for such a discourse is that it be public; a second necessary requirement is 
that it be “free from oppression”, that is , not subject to external sources of systematic 
distortion” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 78; original italics). 
 
The “oppression” and “distortion” referred to by Ulrich can be understood in terms of a 
second theoretical construct offered by Habermas known as the knowledge-constitutive 
interest theory (Habermas, 1971). The theory is based upon the anthropological premise of 
there being two fundamental forms of human activity, work (or ‘labour’) and interaction 
(‘language’ or ‘communication’). Each activity is associated with a particular interest. Work 
is associated with a technical interest in the prediction and control of natural and social 
affairs. Interaction is associated with a practical interest in fostering mutual human 
understanding. In order to realise the full potential of these two human activities - that is, 
having labour free from ‘materialistic’ and economic constraints and demands, and 
communication free from distortion brought about by ‘false consciousness’ - Habermas 
postulates a third emancipatory interest. This interest ensures freedom from coercion. The 
three constitutive interests are invariant though complementary, and are underpinned by three 
equally invariant though complementary ‘rationalities’ which are referred to respectively as 
instrumental, strategic and communicative (Figure 4). 
 
Basis of Human 
Interest 
Knowledge Constitutive Interests 
& Associated Rationalities 
“Work” technical interest in prediction and control of natural and social affairs 
instrumental rationality (labour) 
success depends upon technical mastery over social and natural 
processes 
 
“Interaction” practical interest in fostering mutual understanding 
strategic rationality (human interaction) 
success depends upon practical mastery over ensuring mutual 
understanding 
 
“Power/Authority” emancipatory interest in being free from coercion 
communicative rationality (authority relations) 
success depends upon being free from coercion imposed by power 
relations 
Figure 4. Habermas’ Taxonomy of Knowledge-Constituent Interests. 
Ulrich’s application of Habermas’ pragmatistic model reinforces Churchman’s idea of 
purposeful systems through making explicit the importance of including a dimension of 
human intentionality (Ulrich, 1983 p. 237). Returning to Burrell and Morgan’s framework of 
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social theory paradigms it is evident that CSH does not fit readily into any of the four 
‘paradigms’. CSH might be seen rather in terms of proposing radical change through 
operating a dialectic between the structuralism in the objective domain, as depicted by the 
deliberations of the ‘involved’, and humanism in the subjective domain, as depicted by the 
counter-deliberations offered by the ‘affected’.  
In defining an emancipatory interest, constitutive theory provides an element of purpose 
to the pragmatistic model of inquiry through dialogue between those “involved” and those 
“affected”: 
 
“... the idea of the “emancipatory” interest is to combine the “technical” interest in 
instrumental control with the “practical “ interest in mutual understanding, so as to emancipate 
the inquirer from the seemingly objective (because unreflected) constraints produced by the 
former, technical, interest” (Ulrich, 1983:63). 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, systems practice has undergone what Flood (in Flood & 
Ulrich, 1990) has identified as the two significant epistemological breaks: the first, manifest 
in particular through Checkland’s SSM, has brought in the interpretivist idea of systems 
thinking where systems are considered as epistemological conceptual tools rather than 
ontological real world entities; the second, manifest through Ulrich’s CSH, has highlighted 
the critical interpretivist divide between the (systems) rationale of the involved in contrast to 
the (social) rationale of the affected. Both ‘breaks’ are associated with a constructivist 
epistemology. The challenge remains with reconciling these two “epistemological breaks” 
with constitutive interest theory. With the first break the challenge is to clearly demarcate the 
relevance of constitutive interests to the epistemological idea of systems, in the same way - as 
discussed elsewhere (Reynolds, 1998) - as the ontological relevance of constitutive interests 
has been made relevant in systems practice; that is, alignments of ‘hard’/technical, 
‘soft’/practical, and ‘critical’/emancipatory (cf. Ulrich, 1988b pp. 150-151, Table IV; Oliga, 
1988 p. 92; Flood and Jackson, 1991b pp. 324-325) .  
The second epistemological break bears on the Habermasian ‘emancipatory’ project more 
directly by challenging systems practice to define more clearly the task of emancipating the 
‘affected’ from the “premises and promises of involved experts” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 308). From 
a political or institutional standpoint, systems inquiry has shifted from an ontological concern 
regarding the factors necessary to control and maintain an object system, to a more explicit 
epistemological concern with systemic practice to bring about social transformation. 
 
Systems Change Matters 
The interaction between the involved and the affected corresponds at an institutional level 
with Oliga’s interpretation of the interaction between power and ideology (Oliga, 1990). To 
recap, Oliga contends that the failure of systems practice to engage in the dialectic between 
power and ideology has effectively reinforced measures of social control and stability  rather 
than facilitating social transformation and change. In hard systems approaches this failure is 
brought about by a neglect of the ‘ideological’ constituent (dismissing ‘subjective’) whilst in 
soft systems approaches the failure is due to neglecting issues of ‘power’ (thereby implicitly 
and uncritically accepting ‘false consciousness’). Oliga argues that forces of change can only 
take effect when issues of power and ideology are both “doubted” through critical 
engagement between those involved with and those affected by systems practice.  
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Through its focus on interaction between the involved and the affected, CSH has an 
implicit radical agenda of institutional transformation. Although the methodology cannot 
claim to replace efforts to achieve institutional democratisation, it has a core purpose of 
ensuring that systems are not expert driven but are open to social critique and thereby open to 
radical change (cf. Ulrich, 1988b p. 159). 
The “polemical employment of boundary judgements” is the term given by Ulrich (1983 
p. 313) to the heuristic tool for enabling lay citizens or their representatives (‘witnesses’) to 
question the ‘premises and promises’ of the planners. According to Kant’s critical ideal of 
reason  “... no standpoint, not even the most comprehensive systems approach, is ever 
sufficient in itself to validate its own implications” (Ulrich, 1988b p. 157). Those ‘affected’ 
by a system can theoretically question the premises of experts in a polemical manner without 
assuming any expertise of their own. As Ulrich points out,  polemic...  
 
“entails no positive validity claims and hence requires neither theoretical knowledge nor 
any other kind of special expertise or “competence”. A polemical argument is advanced 
merely in hypothetical fashion, to show the dogmatic character of the opponent’s (“the 
expert’s”) pretension of knowledge” (Ulrich, 1983 p. 305).  
 
The practical limitations are centred around achieving meaningful dialogue between the 
‘involved’ and the ‘affected’ in circumstances where the former might be an unwilling player 
and the latter has little effective means of expression. Flood and Ulrich (1990 p. 201) 
maintain that “... it pays careful and explicit attention not to presuppose that those in control 
of “decision power” are willing to take account of the views and interests of those affected, 
but only that they are interested in making their own views and interests appear to be 
defensible on rational grounds” 
The question raised by Jackson (1985) as to why CSH should suppose that the powerful 
should take account of the views and interests of those affected but not involved is addressed 
by Flood and Ulrich: 
 
“As a rule, the powerful ... seek to conceal their specific private interests behind some 
facade of common interest, of generally acceptable norms or “objective necessities”. A critical 
approach, although it cannot “force” the powerful to take account of the less powerful, can at 
least unveil this facade of rationality and objectivity which is so characteristic of the strategic 
action of powerful vested interests in present-day “interest group liberalism” ...[Polemical 
employment of boundary judgements] pays careful and explicit attention not to presuppose 
that those in control of “decision power” are willing to take account of the views and interests 
of those affected, but only that they are interested in making their own views and interests 
appear to be defensible on rational grounds” (Flood and Ulrich, 1990 p. 201). 
 
Those in power have an interest in justifying the status quo through recourse to 
objectifying their authority (with the implicit intention of rendering harmless their position). 
Ulrich (1988b p. 158) argues that through such strategies the powerful leave themselves open 
to possible exposure and challenge given the application of appropriate social critique enabled 
by “democratically secured institutional arrangements”. Ulrich later suggested possible areas 
for innovation: 
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“...a critically heuristic training for citizens... I believe that the systems idea...might 
become important as a “countervailing power” to face the steadily growing influence of 
expertise in our society, namely, by something like a generally available “expertise of 
laypeople in dealing critically with expertise”. ... I think of new arenas of participatory 
conflict resolution such as “planning cells” and “citizen reports on technological projects”, i.e. 
, institutional arrangements within which citizens, together with experts and designers, can 
train themselves in critically heuristic debate.” (Ulrich, 1993:608, original italics). 
 
The suggestions here were later developed into what Ulrich (2003)  described as critical 
reflective practice, as against another parallel tradition of CST referred to as critical pluralism 
(cf. Mingers, 1997; Jackson, 1999). 
 
 
3.4. Critical Reflective Practice and Critical Pluralism 
 
In the same way that Checkland’s SSM gained prominence within the tradition of soft 
systems approaches, Ulrich’s CSH  emerged and developed prominence during the same 
period within a critical systems thinking tradition. CST was named in the mid-1980s, and was 
later given expression with two significant publications: the journal Systems Practice, first 
published in 1988 and renamed in 1998 as Systemic Practice and Action Research; and 
secondly, a compilation text in 1991 entitled Critical Systems Thinking: Directed Readings 
(Flood and Jackson, 1991a). The Centre for Systems Studies at Hull University has played a 
leading role in promoting CST through encouraging research and publications.  
A particular variant of CST promoted at Hull is one based on promoting methodological 
and theoretical pluralism. The dominant expression of this is total systems intervention (TSI) 
– a methodology for drawing different methods together through a three-fold process of (i) 
creatively exploring problematic situations, (ii) choosing an appropriate systems approach, 
and (iii) implementing it (Flood and Jackson, 1991b). The emphasis on pluralism has been  
championed in particular by Mike Jackson. TSI builds on an earlier categorisation of systems 
methodologies (Jackson and Keys, 1984) called system of systems methodologies (SOSM). 
SOSM provides a matrix for classifying systems methods on two dimensions: one, the level 
of complexity of the problem situation (simple or complex), and the other, the degree of 
shared purpose amongst participant stakeholders (unitary, pluralist, or coercive relationships). 
It is this latter dimension that draws on the hard, soft, critical typology using metaphors as 
guiding principles – mechanic for the ‘hard’, living organism for the ‘soft’ and the metaphor 
of prison for the ‘critical’ situations. The classification yields a six celled matrix as illustrated 
in Table 3. Each cell defines a problem situation which then invites particular suitable 
systems methods (some examples are given). 
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Table 3. System of systems methodologies 
 
 Participants 
Unitary 
‘hard’ systems based 
on mechanistic 
metaphor 
Pluralist 
‘soft’ systems based 
on organic metaphor 
Coercive 
‘critical’ systems 
based on prison 
metaphor 
‘Systems’ 
i.e., 
problem 
situations 
Simple  Simple unitary: e.g. 
systems engineering 
Simple pluralist: e.g. 
Strategic assumption  
surfacing and testing  
Simple coercive: 
e.g., critical systems 
heuristics 
Complex Complex unitary: 
e.g., system 
dynamics, viable 
systems model 
Complex pluralist: 
e.g. soft systems 
methodology 
Complex coercive: 
(non available!) 
Adapted from Jackson, 2000 p.359. 
 
The two dimensions of situations are helpful in delineating the two aspects of systems 
thinking described above. The simple/ complex dimension relates to levels of interrelatedness 
and interdependencies, and the unitary/ pluralist/ coercive dimension relates to levels of 
engagement with multiple perspectives. Again such a model has been helpful in prompting 
systems practitioners to think more clearly about the nature of the problem situation – the 
‘mess’ – in a simplified manner. It has helped with the appreciation that different systems 
methods might complement each other and indeed complement other approaches used for 
similar problem situations.  
There are two difficulties with TSI. First, that a problem situation can somehow be easily 
identified as constituting one of the six ‘problem situation’ types by an expert practitioner 
seems to deny possibilities of there being underlying contrasting perspectives on the situation 
amongst different stakeholders. What may appear to be simple or unitary from one ‘expert’ 
perspective can often actually be quite coercive from the perspective of other stakeholders 
associated with the situation. Second, there is an underpinning difficulty in  the pigeon-holing 
of particular systems approaches as being only suitable for specific types of situation. Firstly, 
there may be different opinions on where different systems approaches ‘fit’ based upon actual 
experiences of using the approach. A study of 30 key systems thinkers as practitioners (rather 
than focusing on methods associated with them) reveals the rich and diverse experiential 
background of using different systems approaches (Ramage and Shipp, 2009). Secondly, such 
pigeon-holing takes away the potential for systems approaches to themselves adapt and 
develop through different contexts of use amongst different users. A revised account of five 
systems approaches – system dynamics, viable systems model, strategic options development 
and analysis, soft systems methodology, and critical systems heuristics – drawn from various 
philosophical traditions suggests that their respective robustness over 30 years of use derives 
from their adaptability by different users in different contexts of use (Reynolds and Howell, 
2010). Whilst systems approaches may well have derived from particular paradigmatic 
traditions of either functionalism, interpretivism or critical social theory, this does not imply 
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that they remain fixed in this tradition (ibid p.296). So whilst sociological paradigms may be 
helpful in understanding the origins of particular systems approaches, they are less helpful in 
theorizing and steering practice for developing methodologies based on mixed methods (Zhu, 
2011).   
Ulrich contrasts TSI, which he views as constituting a ‘shallow’ form of 
complementarism, with what he calls a ‘deeper complementarism’ offered by boundary 
critique underpinning critical reflective practice (Ulrich, 2003). This deeper sense of 
methodological complementarism does not privilege multiple methods per se but neither does 
it alienate or devalue any particular method. Rather than suggesting that there are appropriate 
methods for different predefined contexts, there is an acknowledgement of value given to any 
professional practice but that any such practice can benefit from a reflection on how it deals 
with judgments of ‘fact’, value judgements and boundary judgements. Boundary critique can 
therefore complement any methodology as a reflective tool. This deeper sense of 
complementarism using boundary critique at the level of methodology resonates with the 
theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) and the  deeper sense in using Habermas’ 
three knowledge constitutive interests at the level of theory in a more integral fashion for 
critical systems thinking (Reynolds, 2002). Traditions of American pragmatism with the 
writings of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, also provide more helpful 
theorizing frameworks for systems practice (Ulrich, 2006; Zhu, 2011). 
Ulrich and Reynolds (2010) have further delineated two forms of boundary critique – 
boundary reflection and boundary discourse. Boundary reflection corresponds to a framework 
for understanding. Boundary discourse corresponds to a framework for practice. Together 
they contribute towards the framework for systems thinking in practice introduced earlier 
(Figure 2). The next section examines the implications of this critical systems framework for 
contemporary critical thinking. 
 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF A ‘CRITICAL’ SYSTEMS THINKING IN PRACTICE 
 
The previous section provides a framework for understanding the emergence of 
contemporary systems thinking in practice. But how might this inform a framework for 
practice for engaging with different perspectives and a framework for responsibility in 
enacting systems thinking in practice from a critical perspective? 
From a contemporary ‘soft’ and ‘critical’ systems perspective, systems are regarded as 
conceptual constructs enabling an interdisciplinary space for purposeful conversation across 
disciplines and for exploring possibilities for creative change. In the context of international 
development discourse I have called this a ‘creative space’ (Reynolds, 2008b). If systems 
thinking in practice provides such a potentially powerful agent of change, what is that may 
inhibit such change?  In the practical domain of engaging with different perspectives, the fear 
for change is manifest in the traps of uncritical thinking that pervade our everyday practices. 
Aligned with these traps is an unclear use of language around systems thinking. What 
precisely is meant by the terms systemic, systematic and system and how might such terms be 
more meaningfully incorporated in to a critical systems literacy? 
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4.1 Three traps of thinking in practice 
Three particular traps of thinking in practice can be highlighted (Reynolds and Holwell, 
2010, pp. 5-6; pp. 301-303). Each trap is associated with an uncritical focus on each of the 
three pillars of a framework for systems thinking in practice introduced earlier (Figure 2)  – 
(i) silo problem-solving (fixing situations) representing the trap of reductionism, (ii) people 
management in (fixing people) representing the trap of dogmatism, and (iii) systems 
obsession (with fixed ideas) representing the trap of fetishism (with expressions of uncritical 
holism and pluralism). Each of these traps can then be aligned with relevant systems ideas 
associated with managing change. 
 
 
Trap 1: Silo Problem-Solving: Towards Anticipating Systemic Change 
 
“We are most comfortable working in silos – our own, independent function or 
department, our own industry or agency, our own sector (business, government, civil)… Our 
structures hardwire us into silos, reinforcing independent rather than interdependent habits – 
even matrix organizations are still fixed within topic-specific domains, and the fact that non-
governmental or non-profit agencies are segregated by function (education, healthcare, 
housing, etc.) creates the same silo mindsets” (Huston 2007 p.46). 
 
The conventional functionalist systems idea of organisation – a whole consisting of 
related parts contributing to a particular function - has contributed considerably to a 
reification of this type of silo thinking. Organisations are typically organised with 
departmental terms of reference carrying clearly defined remits for employees. The idea is 
neat, easy to work with in terms of providing some assurance of certainty, or at least lack of 
ambiguity, and most importantly, as suggested above, comfortable. Comfort is conventionally 
drawn from some basic (mis)understanding about organisations working as self-contained 
functional systems, the output of which is unquestionably some ‘good’ for the wider 
community. It pervades many impressions of organisations whether small and simple or large 
and complex. The UK National Health Service (NHS) for example was likened to a super-
tanker by a British Government Minister in the 1980s. The analogy conjures up not just 
slowness and difficulty in being re-directed, but that there are discrete parts with particular 
functions all contributing towards an ultimate destination. The image is very much in contrast 
to many complexity theorists such as the Noble laureate, Ilya Prigogine (1997), who claims 
that no static system can exist. Organisations like the health service are inherently 
unpredictable because they continually change from within due to the changing dynamics of 
interrelated parts. This is what is meant by systemic change. 
A systemic issue comprises complexity, uncertainty, interdependencies and controversy 
involving a wide range of variables requiring resolution. A technical problem on the other 
hand bounded by a fixed bounded silo occupies the more comfortable domain, amenable to a 
solution, usually provided by a traditional ‘expert’. Characteristics of issues are troublesome! 
They can sometimes distract from getting things done. But can they be ignored?  
The trap of silo thinking is based upon the idea that such issues can be ignored. It is 
associated with reductionism. A critical perspective on systems acknowledges that, to use a 
famous systems adage, a system is merely a map of a situation or territory, not to be confused 
with the actual territory. Real world complexities represent something that exists outside of 
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any one conceptualisation of context. The real world complexity provides the site for 
systemic change. In terms of a systems literacy, the tension between system and situation 
might be appreciated in terms of a conversation. The distinction between thinking about 
systems and systems thinking is helpful in clearing ground between systems thinking and 
related disciplines associated with systems sciences (e.g., complexity and chaos theory). It 
respects rather than struggles against two different perceptions of ‘systems’: one, as with 
systems thinking, an epistemological construct; the other, as with systems sciences, more an 
ontological entity. 
A key underplayed intent of systems thinking associated with systemic change is to make 
simple the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies in a transparent (and 
thereby questionable) manner. In short, systems thinking about systemic change involves a 
continual conversation between ‘systems’ and ‘situations’; a tension expressed through the 
act of making simple the complex – a tension that invites more an artistic rather than 
scientific literacy. This is not to deny the importance of a scientific literacy promoting more 
detailed understanding in terms of, say, evolutionary science, chaos theory and complexity 
sciences, but the craft of systems thinking is primarily geared towards making manageable the 
complex. The task involves using a language that is accessible to all stakeholders.  
Trap 2: Fixing People: Towards Purposeful Systematic Change 
 
Glendower: 
I can call spirits from the vasty deep. 
 
Hotspur:  
Why, so can I, or so can any man; but will they come when you do call for them? 
 
From William Shakespeare (Henry IV Pt.1 Act III Scene 1)  
 
"A systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of another" 
(Churchman 1968 p.231). 
 
The Shakespeare quotation was used as an introduction to the British House of Commons 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (March, 2003) report: The Water 
Framework Directive (WFD): Fourth Report of Session 2002-03 Volume 1 p.5. HC130-1. Its 
purpose was to highlight the problem and inadequacy of conventional approaches towards 
environmental management through control-orientated fiscal and regulatory measures.  
 
The trap of ‘fixing people’ into pre-designed purposes – ‘purposive management’ – is 
based upon the misguided behaviourist idea that different purposes from different 
perspectives can be moulded into a consensual purpose. The story of failure in organizational 
change projects, and the argument for WFD, in contrast, suggests alternative strategies based 
upon working with people/ stakeholders rather than working on them. The trap here is related 
to the trap of dogmatism. Systemic failure in many situations can often be associated with the 
dogmatic disregard of other perspectives that inform the situation.  
The literacy called for requires not just simplifying realities for individual comprehension 
but making sense of realities for mutual understanding amongst stakeholders involved in a 
situation in order to foster shared practice. This second aspect of a systems literacy speaks to 
the human dimension of intervention. As such it speaks of systematic change; change directed 
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by human agents. The term ‘systematic’ relates to an inevitable requirement of orderliness. 
Our means of communication through language and discourse requires levels of 
systematisation to a greater or lesser extent so as to generate some sense of mutual 
understanding.  
The systems literacy relates to two significant intervention theories. In 1960 Douglas 
McGregor published The Human Side of Management, in which he introduced the concept of 
Theory X and Theory Y styles of management. Theory X is the conventional mechanistic 
style of top-down management treating people as having no responsibility, preferring to be 
told what to do and to have decisions made for them. Theory Y conversely assumes a more 
constructive role: 
 
“It was quite an article of faith, this Theory Y. Everything about the structure of 
corporations went against it: the perks and power structure of the hierarchy, the labour 
relations tradition, the curricula at most business school…, and all those devices like 
performance appraisals, that measured one person against another. Adopting Theory Y would 
mean giving up both the stick (threatening to fire people) and the carrot (bribing them or being 
paternalistic). Without those two weapons, what leverage did a manager have?  Only the 
ability to spark other people’s involvement and commitment, by giving them the opportunities 
to do good work—hardly a strong incentive by conventional standards” (Kleiner 1996 p. 46). 
 
The second idea of social learning is situated in planning theory. John Friedman (1987) 
describes social learning as the third of four traditions informing planning  - the other three 
being ‘social reform’, ‘policy analysis’ and ‘social mobilization’. He contrasts social learning 
with the more control-oriented tradition of policy analysis which, he claims: 
 
"is a form of anticipatory decision-making, a cognitive process that uses technical reason 
to explore and evaluate possible courses of action.... Social learning, on the other hand, begins 
and ends with action, that is, with purposeful activity… It is the essential wisdom of the social 
learning tradition that practice and learning are construed as correlative processes, so that one 
process necessarily implies the other." (Friedman 1987 p. 181). 
 
Social learning, like Theory Y, invokes a proactive engagement amongst stakeholders in 
systematically managing change. The idea moves away from implementation modelled on 
hierarchical notions of working on people – restructuring, reconfiguring, re-engineering – and 
then dealing with inevitable subsequent resistance amongst stakeholders, towards a more 
collective notion of working with people – stakeholding development. The notion of social 
learning builds on the importance of nurturing the tension between changing practice and 
understanding between stakeholders (Blackmore et al. 2007; Reynolds 2008b). The learning 
here is collaborative (hence ‘social’) involving multiple stakeholders including professional 
experts, and the action is concerted, again involving multiple stakeholders. The notion of 
concerted action is captured in the metaphor of an orchestra, with multiple individual players 
doing different things, though all contributing towards some hopefully harmonious output. 
Conventional systematic change is purposive. This involves a linear application of tools 
to serve a prescribed purpose.  In contrast, purposeful systematic change involves use of 
language, amongst other tools, for iterating on better revised goals based on improved 
understanding and better practice.  
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Trap 3: Maintaining Systems or ‘Systems’ Obsession: Toward Meaningful 
Systems Change 
 
“To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail” (Mark Twain). 
 
This familiar mantra provides a reminder that our tools and models, including systems 
frameworks as systems tools, can often be sub-consciously overpowering in determining how 
we approach issues. But what about its counterpart?  Continually adopting ‘new’ systems 
runs the risk of elevating the notion of ‘system’ to a fetish status; celebrating the very notion 
of system as being the panacea for crises. Systems are often referred to in association with 
new developments – miraculous ways of doing things. 
The trap of systems maintenance, or being obsessive with the tools we construct, lies in 
reifying and privileging the ‘system’ - whether it’s old or new – as though it has some 
existence and worth outside of the user and some status beyond its context of use in enabling 
change. McGregor’s Theory X depicting a conventional model of management hierarchically 
imposed and indiscriminately applied across all parts of an organisation, regarding 
stakeholders as objects rather than subjects, is perhaps the most pervasive example of an 
implicit system - a conceptual model - resilient to change. It is a pervasive way of thinking 
that continues to hold a widespread grip on management practice. There are many other 
‘systems’ that similarly entrap our understanding and practice. A generic term for these is 
‘business as usual’ (BAU). Examples include the annual cycles of organisational planning, 
target setting, budgeting, the development of performance indicators and performance related 
pay incentives etc. BAU models maintain existing ‘systems’ principally because of a fear for 
change. But the fear is not evenly distributed amongst all stakeholders. Some fear change 
more than others simply because the system works in a partial manner. The system works for 
some and not for others. 
All systems are partial. They are necessarily partial – or selective – in the dual sense of (i) 
representing only a section rather than the whole of the total universe of considerations, and 
(ii) serving some parties -  or interests -  better than others (Ulrich 2002  p. 41). In other 
words, no proposal, no decision, no action, no methodology, no approach, no system can get a 
total grip on the situation (as a framework for understanding) nor get it right for everyone (as 
a framework for practice) (Reynolds, 2008a). 
Drawing on the quotation from Chapman at the beginning of this chapter, the two 
dimensions of partiality respond to the two transitions implicit in systems thinking about 
systems change; one, towards holism, and another towards pluralism. Given the partiality of 
systems a third critical dimension is required where systems boundaries inevitably need to be 
made and questioned on the inevitable limitations of being holistic and pluralistic.  
Frameworks are used widely as a means of providing some overriding shape and 
guidance towards recommended action. Different systems approaches can be considered as 
frameworks. Systems are more detailed expositions of a framework. The relationship between 
a framework and systems is analogous to that between policy and plans. Whereas policy 
provides an overall guidance structure, individual plans around projects and programmes 
might be considered as expressions of policy. Indeed the term policy framework is often used 
to describe the wider setting of planning initiatives on projects and programmes. As the name 
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implies, framework has two interrelated parts; one, a cognitive or conceptual device – a frame 
of reference which, two, enables work through systems (plans, projects, programmes etc.) 
The trap of fetishism signals responsibility in systems thinking in two dimensions – one 
towards understanding and another towards practice. First, with respect to understanding, 
there is an imperative to continually ask questions of ‘systems’; to appreciate them as 
judgements of fact rather than matters of fact. For example, when confronted with arguments 
of an iniquitous ‘economic system’ generating continual social and ecological 
impoverishment, or an ‘education system’ that systematically continues to marginalise 
particular sectors of our community, systems practitioners have a responsibility to create 
space for, and help support the framing of, better systems, rather than perpetuating the myth 
that these are some God-given realities that we need to simply live with. 
Second, with respect to practice, the sense of responsibility here lies with our humility in 
systems design; in avoiding inclinations to fetishise systems. Geoffrey Vickers cautioned 
against over-enthusiasm in the models (that is, systems) that we generate (Vickers 1987). We 
can often live by the dictate of models rather than, as should be, the changing realities in 
which the models are applied and which ought to further shape or indeed make redundant 
such models.  
 
4.2 Towards a critical systems literacy 
The risk of systems obsession is akin to moralism. Humberto Maturana makes a relevant 
point distinguishing between being moralistic and ethical. Moralists, he suggests, “lack 
awareness of their own responsibility. People acting as moralists do not see their fellow 
human beings because they are completely occupied by the upholding of rules and 
imperatives; that is a particular systems design. They know with certainty what to be done 
and how everybody else has to behave” (Maturana & Poerksen 2004 p.207). Being ethical, in 
contrast requires giving legitimacy to people, and particularly those who may disagree with 
the rules. Using our own form of systems literacy,  systems boundaries (the domain of 
systems change) are subject to systematic changes invoked by the designers and users of 
systems, and systemic changes invoked by those subject to the use of systems. There is here a 
triadic interplay between three perpetual factors – systems with their boundaries, people and 
their values, and real world entities and events in the factual domain. The relationship 
between them can be expressed in terms of either an entrapped vicious circle or a liberating 
virtuous cycle. For example, in terms of vicious circles, the Mark Twain quote might be seen 
in terms of a hammer (a system’s tool), the hammerer (systematic people), and the hammered 
(systemic events). The analogy of the UK National Health Service to a super tanker ship 
might be interpreted in terms of a steer (the system or definitive plan of direction), a steerer 
(systematic pilots or experts), and the steered (passive passengers). 
The three types of trap noted above represent responses to particular types of well-
founded anxiety and fear with managing complex issues. There is the continual fear of 
systemic uncertainty in unforeseen events and unintended consequences, the fear of losing or 
even reinforcing excessive systematic control, and the fear of change in systems; an undue 
ultimate optimism in old or new systems. Table 4 summarises these traps in terms of 
contributing towards a critical literacy of systems thinking in practice. 
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Table 4. Features of a critical systems literacy 
 
Type of 
change 
Location of 
change 
Primary  
intent 
Risks or  
traps 
Some key 
vocabulary 
Systemic Complex 
realities or 
situation 
Make simple & 
manageable the 
complex web of 
realities for 
improving 
situations 
Seeing a mess as  simple 
problem-solving i.e.,  
reductionist thinking 
rather than as 
improvement resolution. 
Complexity  
Feedback  
Emergence 
Uncertainty  
Autonomy 
Systematic Stakeholders  Developing mutual 
understanding and 
shared practice  
Fixing people as objects 
for purposive endeavours 
rather than as purposeful  
subjects.  
Perspectives  
Praxis  
Learning  
Stakeholding  
 
Systems Conceptual 
worlds 
Improvement of 
situations 
and emancipation 
through reflective 
practice 
Complacency and 
obsession  with ‘systems’ 
e.g., as holistic devices, 
rather than as temporary 
pragmatic constructs 
Judgements  
Boundaries 
Reframing 
Critique 
 
A key intent of systems thinking associated with systems change is to continually 
question boundaries of our conceptual constructs with a primary focus on improving the 
situation. That is, with a focus on steering good systemic change.  
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
In an online analysis contrasting the source of scholarly publications in which the terms 
‘critical thinking’ and ‘systems thinking’ were mentioned, 88% of the papers in which the 
term critical thinking appeared were in social sciences, arts and humanities, whereas for 
systems thinking  48% were found in literature from those fields with the remainder being 
dispersed across a range of other disciplines including business, engineering, maths, and 
different biophysical sciences (Cabrera, 2006). As noted by Cabrera, this would suggest that  
systems thinking appears to have significant currency over and above critical thinking in 
fostering a greater engagement of interdisciplinarity.  
The argument put forward in this chapter though is that systems thinking is indeed 
interdisciplinary, but coupled with more explicit attention to critical thinking, systems 
thinking provides for a transdisciplinary engagement; one that transcends conventional 
disciplinary silos. The critical literacy embodied in such transciplinarity is manifest in a 
framework of systems thinking in practice. The notion of systems thinking in practice derives 
from a critical systems perspective constituting three activities associated with three entities – 
(i) a framework for understanding complex interrelationships in the real world context of 
change and uncertainty, (ii) a framework for practice when engaging with different 
perspectives amongst people involved and affected in the contexts of interest, and (iii) a 
composite framework for responsibility acknowledging the limiting and integral features of 
framing understanding and framing practice in the conceptual world of ideas and tools. The 
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framework appreciates (multi)disciplinary efforts towards framing an understanding of 
interrelationships and interdependencies of complex realities in the real world. The 
framework practically engages with multiple perspectives in endeavours of interdisciplinarity 
towards framing some sense of mutual understanding across different disciplines and 
perspectives. And most importantly the framework transcends disciplines through both (i) 
boundary reflection – checking on the partiality of understanding judgements of ‘fact’ 
through any one disciplinary framework – and (ii) boundary discourse – checking against the 
partiality of value judgments that inevitably inform any inquiry from any disciplinary or 
indeed interdisciplinary perspective. The transdisciplinary framework acts as a framework for 
responsibility. Together the three frameworks working together constitute a framework of 
systems thinking in practice. 
Whereas a systems literacy involving systemic and systematic change provides a 
language to mediate between the mess of real world situations, and the systems (including 
methods, methodologies, approaches) used to deal with them, a critical systems literacy 
involving in addition, systems change, provides a language to mediate between systems ideas 
developed amongst systems practitioners and established thinking and practice associated 
with different professional traditions. The critical literacy refers to all approaches, whether 
traditionally systems based or belonging to other traditions of professional practices. It is in 
the practice of using them whilst being aware of the inevitable traps – reductionism (silo 
problem-fixing), dogmatism (fixing people), and systems fetishism associated with holism 
and pluralism (fixed systems) – that enables a critical systems literacy. 
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